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Background and motivation
Income contingent loans (ICL) may provide an efficient and equitable option for extending taxpayer-funded paid parental leave (PPL) schemes, which may be otherwise limited in duration and payment amounts due to fiscal pressures. A lack of liquidity and market failure can prevent families from financing an extension of leave beyond that typically offered in most OECD countries through taxpayer-funded PPL. It is argued that an ICL could provide consumption smoothing and encourage participation, yet taxpayer costs could be kept low (if not zero) provided scheme design mitigates against adverse selection and moral hazard. An appropriately designed scheme could also be welfare enhancing to parents even in the absence of taxpayer subsidies.
The benefits of paid parental leave
Paid parental leave (PPL), like higher education, is an investment in human capital. It can improve maternal health and parental workforce attachment, as well as child health and development.
New parents without paid parental leave, or with insufficient leave, have to make a choice between resigning from work (which many cannot afford to do), or returning to work sooner than they would otherwise desire. For some parents both are poor options. The former clearly impacts negatively on personal lifetime income and retirement savings, and leads to higher welfare benefit outlays and the loss of taxation revenue. The latter can result in poorer parental and child health and developmental outcomes.
A strong argument for PPL derives from observed labor force disparities between the genders, which lead women to experience lower skill development and lower levels of financial independence. One barrier to greater participation is that women, due to the generally more flexible and casual nature of their employment, are likely to be particularly responsive to work disincentives that can arise from generous welfare systems. In the absence of welfare reform, policy such as PPL may help counter these distortions by encouraging workforce attachment. Further, a well-designed PPL scheme can promote employment prior to childbirth (if prior employment is a condition of scheme eligibility), intentionally decrease employment following childbirth (thus improving health and developmental outcomes), and improve attachment to the workforce and workplace. A further benefit can come from greater family equality and role sharing if PPL leads to a more equitable distribution of formal and informal labor between parents.
In addition, there are important physical and mental benefits to the mother from not resuming paid employment too soon after the birth of their child (see, for example, HREOC, 2002; O'Neill, 2004) . There is also a wealth of research that clearly shows the benefits to a child's physical and cognitive development from breastfeeding and parental care in early life, with longer periods of PPL associated with increased rates of breastfeeding (Productivity Commission, 2009).
Who should pay?
In terms of efficiency, whether the government should commit funds to support PPL depends on whether or not the public benefits outweigh the costs. The identification of positive externalities would suggest a case for government intervention; if the benefits of PPL are returned to society then the costs should be borne by society. Equally, if a proportion of the benefits are returned to the individual, then the individual should finance a proportion of the leave. The combination of both public and private benefits of PPL is one argument for the sharing of costs between all taxpayers and recipients rather than drawing on broad taxes.
Identifying the extent of the externalities in social policy such as PPL, however, is not straightforward, particularly when these can manifest through increased productivity, taxation revenue, or lower health costs over the lifetime of both parent and child. A paucity of empirical studies, and inconclusive theory on the relationship between PPL and earnings or health care costs, makes determination of the relative magnitude of community versus private benefits impractical.
The question of whether PPL should be funded partially or exclusively by government is also a question of equity. Subsidization may result in income redistribution, as well as improved scheme participation.
